Biometrics has become a major field of study in the area of computer security. Liveness tests complement biometric systems by introducing an extra level of authentication to prevent identity forgeries. In this abstract we present the fundamental ideas behind a new authentication paradigm that captures the individual's unique signature by measuring unconsciously motivated mistakes or actions. The robustness of our system relies on the hypothesis that each individual possesses behavioural characteristics that are brought about by some unique traits (i.e. how information is processed, categorized and accessed) that are not consciously accessible to the individual and can be measured as that individual's unique behavioural signature. We will refer to this unconsciously motivated behavioural signature as the unconsciousness signature. An implicit result includes the use of our proposed system as a liveness detection mechanism. Here we describe our hypotheses and provide a rationale that indicates their suitability for further studies as a new authentication paradigm.
INTRODUCTION
Authentication systems typically verify the identity of a user based on something the user knows (e.g., a password), something the user has (e.g., an access card), or on something the user is (e.g., a fingerprint). Security biometrics can be divided into two categories: a) behavioural biometrics, these can be based on mouse usage patterns, keystroke latencies, or handwriting dynamics, i.e., something that you do or produce such as a thought; b) physiological characteristics including anthropomorphic measurements such as fingerprints, iris or retina, vein pattern, face, hand or finger geometry, and palm print recognition, i.e., something that you are. We focus our efforts on the latter, while our approach can arguably touch on the former. In recent years, a number of biometric systems have proven to be vulnerable to a number of forgery attacks including reproducing someone's fingerprints using prints left inadvertently on objects such as a glass, doorknobs, etc., or stealing fingerprints from databases. Liveness tests try to prevent these kinds of forgeries by measuring extra features surrounding a particular biometric system such as blood pressure or temperature for the case of fingerprints, sensitiveness to light for the case of iris readers, etc. It has been shown that fingerprint systems can be faked with artificial (gummy) fingerprints (see e.g., [16] ), and iris scanners can be spoofed by superimposing a high resolution iris image with a hole cut out in the middle atop a human eye in front of the scanner (see e.g., [19] ). The latter attempts to spook biometrics authentication and liveness detection by faking a live pupil.
We propose a new authentication paradigm based on signatures of unconsciousness. We focus our analysis on unconsciously motivated mistakes, although largely our analysis would be analogous to unconsciously motivated actions in general. The main hypotheses of our work in progress are that a) unconsciously motivated mistakes meet the requirements for liveness detection; furthermore b) each human being has a unique unconsciousness signature, which c) can be captured by measuring their behaviour (e.g. mistakes). The first hypothesis is about liveness detection, while the other two hypotheses relate to the problem of authentication. To backup the usefulness of our hypotheses we will also have to prove that forging certain unconsciously motivated behaviour such as mistakes unfeasible or at least sufficiently difficult, which we compare to the "inverse" Turing test consisting of measuring artificial stupidity based on the liveness of human errors. Our hypotheses, if we are able to prove them right, will become the foundations for infallible liveness tests, and a thorough usability study will reveal its practicability in real life. A liveness test based on unconscious mistakes can not fall totally into a single category as "something that you are" or "something that you do." Thus, instead of classifying our approach into a single category, we prefer to position our ideas as a hybrid system. Fig. 1 depicts a possible scenario where our system will stand in terms of cost / accuracy trade-offs with respect to other biometrics technologies. The place of our approach with respect to the accuracy of other systems is not yet well determined, however, we believe that our system will be quite competitive in terms of implementation costs since no special device will be required except for a regular computer interface where the individual can answer a set of questions or respond to a set of stimuli. Yet, we need to consider human-computer interaction (HCI) factors, which play an important role in the feasibilityand possibly commercial success-of an authentication system. We speculate that to be able to capture an unconscious signature, an individual would have to answer a possibly "large" number of questions, which may be lengthy and tedious in practice. Fig. 2 depicts a likely scenario describing this accuracy / HCI trade-off.
Some previous work. We have identified some relevant previous work. For example, Silver et al. [21] proposed and developed a system capable of tracking users' typing mistakes (among other characteristics such as time elapsed between the space bar and a character) and to use the data for identification purposes. They suggest that typing can potentially be used for authenticating a small (<30) group of users. During their experiments, the participant would type a set of words (about 10 words), and they were motivated to not commit mistakes by having to retype the whole set of words in case a typo was committed; however no analysis is made with respect to whether this motivational measure was successful in avoiding mistakes, nor is there any suggestion on what possibly caused the individual difference in mistakes that were made. A more recent study by Ferro et al. [8] consists of an authenticating seat. This system has a number of sensors in the seat, which capture different positions of each individual. The tests involved 40 participants and the authentication error rates turned to be as low as 7%. While the authors recognize that some factors may affect the performance of the seat sensors (e.g., carrying objects in the back pockets), they provide no information as to whether the positions were correlated with various traits such as mood, time of the day, or other factors that may unconsciously affect people's postures. Thorpe et al. [23] present an interesting piece on pass-thoughts authentication where they make an interesting analysis of the robustness of their system. While their study provides clear evidence of the potential of this technology, they conclude that further experimentation will be needed in order to draw concrete conclusions. With the emergence of commercial mind-reader devices, we would anticipate a boom in new authentication paradigms (see e.g., http://www.emotiv.com/). 
Contributions. (1)
We outline the requirements for authentication and how these requirements can be met by unconsciousness signatures. (2) We also justify the suitability of unconsciousness measurement systems in a number of practical applications. (3) We provide a summary of possible attacks against our envisioned system. (4) Moreover, we provide directions for the design of an authentication system of this nature.
THE CENTRAL HYPOTHESIS
Our work is based on the hypothesis that each individual possesses unique and measurable characteristics that are motivated by certain unconscious traits such as how information is processed, categorized, and ultimately used to guide behavior. There is currently little consensus within cognitive science over the meaning of unconscious processing (see Bargh and Morsella [2] ). Here we take unconsciousness to refer to any cognitive processing of information that influences the person's attitude and behavior without the person being able to directly access it, reflect on it or verbalize it. On this view the person is at least in some sense of the word aware of what is happening in their surroundings, but largely unaware of what motivates and guides their behaviour.
There is substantial evidence in neuroscience suggesting a sophisticated behavioural guidance system that operates largely outside of one's conscious awareness (see Barg and Morsella [2] for this point and a good review of relevant research, see also Dienes and Perne [4] ). In accordance with this view Chun and Jiang [3] found that people learn and represent complex task-related information and use it to guide behaviour without being conscious of the information or how it guides their behaviour. Greenwald and Banaji [10] found that social behaviour, which often is assumed under conscious control, actually operates largely unconsciously, marked by the person's past experience and knowledge in a way that the person is not aware of. Similarly, Kirsh and Maglio [14] found that when playing the highly interactive video game Tetris, participants started to manipulate the zoids (the shapes) as they appeared on the screen long before any subjective experience (and decision-making) of where and how to fit the zoids took place. Rather, the participants seemed to be interacting with the environment first, and their subjective experience of what happened came later. When asked, the participants described various strategies, but their descriptions never reflected an awareness of how early manipulation of the blocks influenced performance on the shape-fitting task. Tapping into the person's unconscious motivation and style by measuring behaviour may be a new way to identify that person and thus we plan to explore this as a possible unconsciousness fingerprinting technique. Given the evidence it is reasonable to assume that certain behavioural patterns may emerge in specific task-related situations that the person is unaware of and unable to verbalize. We can also assume some individual differences in the behavioural pattern, based on the person's past learning and experiences (see for example, Greenwald et al. [11] ) The question however, is whether those behavioural patterns are unique enough and stable enough to identify an individual across time and situations. Fig. 3 depicts the area of the human mind we are interested in, and contrasts this area with other forms of biometric identification. In order to capture the person's unique unconsciousness signature we need to determine the relevant task. An example of behaviour that may reflect the person's uniqueness could be the route taken to the mailbox every morning, attitudes towards certain social groups, or errors and response selection in certain task context. Following Jain et al. [13] , the measured behaviour needs to be 1) universal (performed by everyone), 2) distinctive (it can distinguish between any two individuals), 3) persistent (it is displayed in consistent manners over time) and 4) collectable (it can be measured quantifiably). The measured behaviour also needs to be such that it is hard to forge and it is not that easily affected by environmental factors like tiredness, stress and learning. For example, someone's walk route to the mailbox may be very persistent over time and also unique enough to distinguish one individual from another. However, such behaviour is not easily quantifiable and is also very predictable and can therefore easily be forged. Fig. 3 . We are interested in using the unconscious area for authentication or liveness tests.
Our interest here is in people's responses to certain task stimuli like arithmetic, shapes, object ordering, colours and so on. In particular, the errors people make when making judgments under time pressure. One way to measure unconsciously motivated behaviour like errors is to use some form of a forced-choice paradigm, where the individual is forced to choose a particular stimulus or stimuli from a predetermined set of stimuli. The individual's selection implies previously learned but implicit material, learned trait or a particular way of processing, categorizing and accessing information. An example of a suitable task could be randomly generating letters or numbers either by hitting keys on the keyboard or by saying the numbers or letters out loud. By having the subject do this repeatedly over time, certain patterns may start to emerge. The assumption here is that those patterns are different for each individual.
While a number of innovative authentication approaches have been extensively studied, they have neglected some important issues related to HCI. For example, Thorpe et al. [23] present an innovative authentication method using passthoughts, which they argue to have important impact and usefulness in a number of specific scenarios, however its applicability in a typical authentication setting results are quite limited due to the equipment required for reading users' brain signals. HCI is a branch of computer science that studies the design and applications of effective computer interfaces (including their hardware and software), to facilitate interaction between users (humans) and computers, taking into account their context of use (see [5, 20] ). The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) defines HCI as: "a discipline concerned with the design, evaluation and implementation of interactive computing systems for human use and with the study of major phenomena surrounding them." [1] . In order to improve the overall use of authentication systems, it is necessary to implement a number of usability methods and design considerations in the authentication interface design process. Usability is an area of HCI that measures how easily people use a computer system, and whether that system (and especially its interface) accomplishes its purpose (see [5] ). Usability testing comprises studies and analyses of a computer interface made by end users and usability/HCI experts, based on already established protocols and methods ( [17, 5] ). According to Halpert's recommendations [12] , the design of usable authentication systems requires at least some fundamental issues, as follows:
1. Security and usability cannot be treated as add-ons. 2. A common goal of "fulfilling user expectations" must be met. 3. Incorporate "security decisions into the users workflow" that are part of a system's main functionality. As per liveness needs, Table 1 presents a summary of liveness authentication requirements and how our system can meet these requirements.
POSSIBLE FORGERIES AND FORESEEING CHALLENGES
In this section we analyze some possible scenarios that may hinder the feasibility of our approach to be used as a biometric system, and try to provide some insight into how to deal with them. In our discussion we consider forgery threats outlined by Roberts [19] .
• Fake physical or digital biometric. In this scenario, Oscar would try to impersonate Alice by mimicking her unintentional or unconscious action like mistakes, having some previous knowledge of her mistakes.
• False data injection. Here, Oscar would enter false data directly into the authentication system, hoping that these data will pass the authentication test.
• Override feature extraction. In this scenario Oscar interferes with the feature extraction routine to manipulate or provide false data, thus overriding Alice's features.
• Change of system tolerance. In systems where tolerance levels change dynamically according to user authentication attempts, a legal user (insider) would regularly enter intentionally wrong authentication inputs before entering the correct one, thus increasing the system's leniency on wrong inputs and consequently increasing the chances of Oscar being able to impersonate a legal user.
• Decision override / false accept. This attack overrides any decision criteria as accept/accept in all cases. Oscar may perform some physical tampering.
• Template modification. Templates can be stored on the biometric reader or sensor, on a device or within the biometric system. Here Oscar attempts to change, replace, or add templates to match his unconscious signature.
• Template reconstruction. Also known as hill climbing. It is an interactive technique in which Oscar repeatedly tries to forge Alice's unconscious signature by keeping only the changes which improve the score and eventually reaching the acceptance threshold.
• System interconnections and vulnerabilities. Interconnection with other systems in which breaching the interconnected one puts at risk the biometric system. This includes system vulnerabilities such as the OS, storage, sensors, and system configuration. Our goal is to be able to use unconscious mistakes not only for liveness detection but also for authentication.
Thus both processes will take place simultaneously May create time overhead, it should be kept within reasonable limits As per Fig. 2 , this is an issue that we will need to resolve in terms of appropriate HCI Measurements fall within known and proven ranges of acceptance We believe the system can meet this requirement, however thorough experimentation with a prototype will be needed to draw any conclusions on this matter While we do not have the answers to all these threats, we tend to believe that our system will be less prone to these attacks than conventional biometric systems. As we progress our continuing work and further develop our ideas, we will get a clearer picture of how these threats may be implemented in an actual scenario and how severe they may result.
GENERAL COMPONENTS OF OUR APPROACH
In this section we describe the main components of our ideas in a hypothetical scenario. Fig. 4 depicts a flow diagram of the process for enrolling a new user into the system. If the number of identifiable characteristics in unconsciousness is such that only allows for a small consciousness signature space, then we anticipate that it will be hard to authenticate large numbers of users with this technique. Therefore, Fig. 4 includes a loop that will have to be iterated until a unique signature is detected. Nevertheless, if we encounter that the signature space is small it will be obvious that unconsciousness has more potential to become a liveness test rather than an authentication technique. Further experimentation will reveal interesting facts that will dictate courses of action of our work. Fig. 5 illustrates the login process for enrolled users. The questionnaire used in this step should be robust enough to prevent unconsciousness forgeries by insiders, as described in the previous section. Furthermore, the questionnaire used in the "Data acquisition" block should always be different even for the same user, since we would want to prevent users from "getting used" to questions and "realizing" of their unconscious mistakes after a few times the same questions are posed. To obtain useful data on unconscious mistakes and the "mental password" from the users, it is necessary to implement an efficient and unobtrusive computer interface in the authentication system. This requires the support of HCI techniques, including usability guidelines for its construction and iterative interface testing, as well as following users' needs, expectations, and capabilities, based on the user centered design paradigm (see [4] ). It is also necessary to take into account the context of use of the authentication system. That is, the environment and place where the authentication system will be generally used, since this is a piece of information that can be also analyzed to determine possible user thinking patterns. Finally, we point out the potential risks of our work in light of our three hypotheses mentioned at the beginning: a) unconscious mistakes meet the requirements for liveness detection; furthermore b) each human being has a unique unconsciousness signature, which c) can be measured in terms of unintentional mistakes. First, we are aware that we could find that unconsciousness is extremely hard to capture and measure, which will turn our three hypotheses down. Secondly, another risk is that after designing all the mechanisms to measure unconsciousness we will find that the number of users able to authenticate is too small because the number of characteristics that we can measure may be very limited. Thirdly, while we are focusing our attention to unintentional mistakes, it may turn that this is not the right way to measure unconsciousness. Furthermore, a number of threats exist against biometric systems, and our method could be no more secure than existing ones. Nevertheless, the human mind is an exciting area of study, with the potential to really become a means of authentication deployed in large scales; the sole finding of pitfalls and dead ends will take us through fascinating paths that will satisfy, temporarily, our appetite for knowledge, as we continue this work in progress.
DISCUSSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
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